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The European Union’s Passenger Name Record Data Directive 2016/681: Is It Fit For 
Purpose? 
Abstract 
In 2016 the EU introduced a Passenger Name Record data (PNR) Directive. In the EU there 
has been controversy over the acquisition and sharing of PNR data, related mainly to lack of 
safeguards and protection of personal data protection. This article examines these issues 
related to earlier EU PNR agreements with third countries and why previous EU attempts to 
legislate in this area failed. By drawing a comparison with the 2011 PNR Directive proposal, 
the article argues that by meeting the strict EU law on data protection as well as being 
necessary to assist in preventing and detecting acts of terrorism and serious crime it is 
submitted the 2016 Directive is fit for purpose and able to withstand scrutiny by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. 
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1.Introduction 
 
In April 2016 the European Union (EU) introduced its Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data 
Directive to be incorporated into Member States’ national law by the 25th May 2018.1 
Allowing relevant agencies access to PNR data related to air travel, the Directive’s main aim 
is to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute terrorism and serious crime.2 This is the EU’s 
second attempt at introducing a PNR Data Directive as their earlier proposal for a PNR Data 
Directive in 2011 failed on the grounds it had insufficient protection to safeguard an 
individual’s data privacy.3 However, recent events have necessitated the re-introduction of a 
PNR data Directive. In the last eighteen months Europe has witnessed three major terrorist 
                                                          
1 Directive 2106/681, article 18(1). 
2
 Directive 2016/681, para. (2). 
3
 European Commission (2011) ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation 
and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime’ COM(2011) 32 final <http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/news/intro/docs/com_2011_32_en.pdf> , 5th May 2016.   
2 
 
attacks, January4 and November 20155 in Paris and in Brussels in March 20166 killing 179 
people in total. Prior to all three attacks terrorists travelled from, to, outside and within 
countries in the EU. In addition to this, in August 2015 a terrorist attack was prevented by 
passengers on a Thalys train travelling from Amsterdam to Paris.7 Apart from the terrorist 
attacks, a high number of EU citizens have used air travel  as part of their journey to conflict 
zones such as the terrorist group Islamic State’s self-proclaimed caliphate in Syria and Iraq, 
many of whom who have returned to EU Member States. In January 2015 the number of 
citizens from France, the UK, Germany and Belgium that travelled to join Islamic State was 
estimated to be 3,050,8 a number that has risen since then. As a result there have been calls 
for the EU to introduce a PNR Data Directive to monitor passenger airline travel out of and to 
EU Member States. 
Although the EU has now introduced legislation related to the acquisition and exchange of 
PNR data, this has not been a straight forward process. From looking at the rationale behind 
the requirement for PNR data, this article examines the issues and problems related to 
previous EU agreements with third countries over PNR data exchange and the EU’s earlier 
attempts to introduce legislation in this area. The main stumbling block in reaching successful 
agreements and the introduction of legislation has been in ensuring the adequacy of 
protection of passengers’ personal data. This emanates from a fear of expanding a 
surveillance society. The article examines EU data protection laws and judgements from the 
                                                          
4 BBC News (2015) ‘Charlie Hebdo attack: three days of terror’, 14th January 2015, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30708237>, 4th March 2016. 
5
 C. Phipps and K. Rawlinson (2015) ‘Paris attacks kill more than 120 people – as it happened’, The Guardian, 
14th November 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/nov/13/shootings-reported-in-eastern-
paris-live>, 4th March 2016. 
6
 BBC News (2016) ‘Brussels explosions: what we know about airport and metro attacks’, 9th April 2016, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35869985>, 10th April 2016. 
7
 A. Chrisafis (2015) ‘France train attack: Americans overpower gunman on Paris express’, 22nd August 2015, < 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/21/amsterdam-paris-train-gunman-france>, The Guardian, 4th 
March 2016. 
8
 BBC News (2015) ‘Terror threat posed by thousands of EU nationals’, 13th January 2015, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30799637>, 25th January 2015.  
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Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) related to data protection as this is a key 
benchmark to assess if PNR data legislation is fit for purpose. In drawing a comparison 
between the 2011 proposal and 2016 Directive, the article argues that following key CJEU 
decisions related to EU data protection law there are much wider provisions in the 2016 
Directive in relation to safeguards and the protection of personal data. This is in addition to 
assessing the necessity of the directive in relation to preventing terrorism, leading to an 
examination whether the Directive is sufficiently robust to withstand legal challenges. In 
conclusion the article argues the legislators have learnt from earlier experiences and by 
including greater width of data protection provisions, along with it still being necessary, the 
2016 directive is fit for purpose. 
2.  The Rationale Behind the Requirement for PNR Data 
Following Al Qaeda’s attack on the US on the 11th September 2001 (9/11) where terrorists 
associated with Al Qaeda hijacked civil aviation aircraft and flew them into the World Trade 
Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, the US called for tighter control on 
civil aviation travel. This included recording details of airline passengers through PNR data, 
which through the US’ Aviation and Transport Security Act 2001 became a statutory 
obligation. The Act required airline companies operating passenger flights to, from or 
through the US to provide US authorities with electronic access to PNR data that includes 
passenger names and addresses, bank details, credit card details and information about meals 
ordered for flights.9 In Rizer’s analysis on the introduction of the Act, he states US citizens 
accepted the requirement for tighter controls. He makes the point that US citizens’ right to 
privacy and freedom to move throughout the US helped ‘the enemy’ to attack the World 
                                                          
9
 C. Kaunert, S. Leonard and A. McKenzie ‘The social construction of an EU interest in counter-terrorism: US 
influence and internal struggles in the cases of PNR and SWIFT’, 21(4) European Security (2012), 474-496, 
p.483. 
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Trade Centre and the Pentagon.10 It was not just the US that required tighter controls on air 
travel, in 2003 the UK introduced the e-Border scheme where, following a pilot programme 
that ran from 2004 to 2006, an intelligence led approach to border controls was introduced.11 
Under the pilot programme, from October 2005 this included processing PNR data on 
carefully selected routes.12 Through the use of PNR data, the e-Borders scheme developed to 
identify and track movements of terrorists and national security targets as well as identify 
individuals for a range of criminal offences. It was found the intelligence supplied via e-
Borders to the UK police, National Crime Agency and security services was regarded as an 
important component in the overall intelligence picture relating to the fight against terrorism 
and serious organised crime.13 Although e-Borders has been replaced in the UK by ‘The 
Border Systems Portfolio’, PNR data is still perceived as an essential component in the range 
of programmes related to security and law enforcement and is expected to expand to ferry 
and train companies.14 Other states have also introduced security control measures using PNR 
data. The Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection is responsible for 
undertaking the risk assessment and clearance of all passengers arriving into and departing 
Australia. As part of its intelligence led approach to Australia’s border protection, under 
section 64AF Customs Act 1901, the Department is authorised to access PNR data from all 
                                                          
10 A. Rizer ‘Dog Fight: Did the International Battle over Airline Passenger Name records Enable the Christmas 
day Bomber?’ 60(1) Catholic University Law Review (2010), 77-105, p.83. 
11 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, ‘e-Borders and successor programmes Twenty-seventh 
Report of Session 2015-16’ HC 643, 4th March 
2016,<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmpubacc/643/643.pdf>. 
12 House of Lords European Union Committee (2008) ‘The Passenger Name Record (PNR) Framework 
Decision: Report with Evidence’ HL Paper 106, p.22. 
13 J. Vine CBE QPM, Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration ‘Exporting the border? An 
inspection of e-borders, October 2012 – March 2013’ 
<http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/An-Inspection-of-eborders.pdf>, p.3. 
14 G. Vina, ‘UK spending watchdog criticises failure over e-borders programme’ 3rd December 2015, Financial 
Times, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ed156742-990f-11e5-95c7-d47aa298f769.html#axzz4J0EfCJl5> 27th 
August 2016. 
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international air service operators flying to and from Australia.15 In Canada since 2005 the 
Canadian Border Services Agency has collected PNR data under section 107.1, Customs Act 
1985 with data protection of passengers’ information provided under the Protection of 
Passenger Information Regulations 2005. In December 2001 British born Richard Reid (also 
known as the ‘shoe bomber’) attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to 
Miami by detonating explosives hidden his shoe16 and on the 25th December 2009 Umar 
Mutallab attempted to detonate explosives hidden in his underwear on a Northwest Airlines 
flight to Denver.17 It appears the use of aircraft in terrorist attacks has galvanised a number of 
states to demand PNR data be made accessible regarding all flights to and departing from that 
state. Due to strict EU law on data protection, this demand for PNR data by non-EU states 
has been problematic, if not fractious at times, when negotiating agreements with the EU. 
3.  PNR Transfer Agreements with the US 
In May 2004 an agreement was made between the EU Commission and the US Department 
of Homeland Security to transfer PNR data from Europe to the US.18 An obstacle for the EU 
in agreeing to the US requests for PNR data centred on the EU’s obligation that the EU 
should not transfer data to another country that cannot ensure a guarantee to provide an 
adequate level of protection.19 Under the 1995 Data Protection Directive, prior to any data 
exchange it is the Commission’s responsibility to asses if the third country has an adequate 
level of protection of basic freedoms and rights of individuals.20 If the Commission finds the 
                                                          
15 Australian Government Department of Immigration and Border Protection ‘Purpsoe of collection and use of 
PNR data’,https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Ente/Goin/passenger-cards/collection-of-passenger-name-records, 
29th August 2016. 
16
 BBC news (2002) ‘Shoe bomber pleads guilty’ 4th October 2002 < 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2298031.stm> 20th August 2016. 
17
 Rizer, supra  note 14, p.78. 
18
 J. Argomaniz ‘When the EU in the ‘Norm-taker’: the Passenger Name records Agreement and the EU’s 
Internalisation of US Border Security Norms’, 31(1) Journal of European Integration (2009), 119-136,p.123. 
19
 Article 25(4) Data protection Directive 95/46/EC, Kaunert et al supra  note 13, p.484, Argomaniz supra  note 
14, p.123. 
20 Article 25(3) Directive 95/46/EC. 
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third country does not provide an adequate level of protection, Member States are to take 
measures to prevent the transfer of data to the third country. From the outset, one problem 
with the 2004 agreement was the duty on air carriers to provide PNR data, thereby placing 
them in a difficult situation. If they failed to pass on the PNR data to the US authorities they 
could face hefty fines or even lose their flying rights, but if they breached the 1995 Directive 
they could face fines from the EU21 that could cost as much as USD 6,000 per passenger.22 
Applying the1995 Data Protection Directive provisions, in 2006 the CJEU annulled the 2004 
Decision.23 Although the Court had the opportunity to deliberate on issues specifically related 
to the protection of personal data, the CJEU eschewed this as the main focus in their decision 
related to a consideration as to whether the Directive’s scope in processing personal data fell 
outside Community law.24  Examining article 3(2) of the 1995 Directive, the CJEU held as 
the sale of an airline ticket is a supply of a service, the collection of PNR data by airlines is 
an activity that falls within Community law. The CJEU did add as the processing of PNR 
data was regarded as being necessary for safeguarding public security and for law 
enforcement purposes, this resulted in the agreement being annulled. In reaching this decision 
the Court referred to the earlier CJEU decision in Lindqvist 2003,25 and in doing so applied 
the provisions of article 3(2) of the 1995 Directive that states the Directive does not apply to 
the processing of personal data in operations related to public security, defence, state security 
and areas of criminal law.26 As a result, the CJEU held the processing of PNR data by private 
companies falls outside the scope of the 1995 Directive.  Key to this decision was that the 
2004 agreement was incorrectly based on EU transport policy (which was the first pillar of 
                                                          
21 Kaunert et al, supra note 13, p.484. 
22
 P. Pawlak ‘Made in the USA? The Influence of the US on the EU’s Data Protection Regime CEPS – Liberty 
and Security in Europe’, Centre for European Policy Studies website (2009) <http://aei.pitt.edu/15102/1/made-
usa-influence-us-eus-data-protection-regime.pdf>7th March 2016, p.4. 
23 European Parliament v European Council and Commission Joined cases C-317/04 and C-138/04. 
24
 Ibid, para. 54. 
25
 Case C-101/01. 
26 European Parliament v European Council and Commission, supra  note 18, paragraph 59. 
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the EU under the Treaty of Union) rather than the third pillar (which was justice and home 
affairs).  By adopting this position, an early opportunity by the CJEU was missed in 
addressing the sufficiency of personal data protection guaranteed by US authorities.27 A 
second PNR agreement between the EU and the US came into force in 2007 based on the 
collection and processing of the data for state security and criminal law,28 which, in turn, was 
replaced with a third PNR agreement between the EU and the US in 2012. In reaching the 
2012 agreement, the EU Council announced the agreement’s goal was by setting a legal 
framework for the transfer of PNR data it would assist in the prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and related crimes, as well as to help with 
serious cross-border crimes.29  
3.1.  Criticism of Previous EU PNR Agreements 
The main criticism of early EU PNR data agreements is that in prioritising the expansion of 
counter-terrorism cooperation with third countries, especially the US, the EU was not so 
sensitive on data protection rules.30 To some observers this has been more prevalent in the 
EU-US agreements than in EU negotiations with other third countries.31 In building its 
network of allies the EU’s key partner has been the US. In spite of the divergent strategic 
cultures, judicial and data protection practices between the two, no other international actor 
has influenced previous EU policies more comprehensively than the US. This collaboration 
led to concerns about the impact it had on European citizens’ privacy rights.32 To provide an 
                                                          
27 Kaunert et al, supra  note 13, p.485. 
28
 Ibid, p.485-486. 
29
 Council of the European Union ‘Council adopts new EU-US agreement on passenger Name Records (PNR)’ 
9186/12, PRESSE 173, (2012) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/129806.pdf>, 4th March 2016. 
30
 E. Ilbiz, C. Kaunert and D. Anagnostakis (2015) ‘The counterterrorism agreements of Europol with third 
countries: data protection and power asymmetry’, Terrorism and Political Violence 
DOI:10.1080/09546553.1092438, 1-18, p.2. 
31 Ibid, pp.8-13. 
32
 J. Argomaniz, The EU and Counter-Terrorism: Politics, polity and policies after 9/11 (Routledge, London, 
2012), p.95. 
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understanding why this is the case Lehrke and Schomaker developed the network hypothesis. 
They state the more embedded a country, or in this case the EU, is in networks through which 
the US could exert influence, the stronger is that country’s counter-terrorism policy.33 In 
applying this hypothesis Lehrke and Schomaker state by having a presence in many different 
EU venues, the US was able to exercise influence on the Council and Commission.34 This 
builds on Pawlak’s earlier study who states as the EU’s security consciousness had not 
developed as rapidly as the US’, the US had the opportunity exert a big influence on 
transatlantic agenda with the US dictating and shaping the EU’s security agenda.35 Following 
the horrific Al Qaeda 9/11 attacks, the 2004 Madrid bombing and 2005 London bombings, 
one problem for the EU was by being in their infancy, the Justice and Home Affairs 
Commission along with its associated agencies Europol and Eurojust, were still developing. 
As a result they had little influence on the international stage either politically or on legal 
issues related to operational matters. An example of this was prior to the 2009 Treaty of 
Lisbon Europol had to sell to EU Member States projects that had to be given priority, 
whereas today projects developed with Member States must be in line with Europol’s overall 
strategy.36 With the EU realising the need to support international co-operation to counter the 
international terrorist threat, one can see how the US took advantage of the EU’s relative 
unpreparedness to counter those threats. The impact of the Treaty of Lisbon provisions and 
the development of the EU’s justice and home affairs agencies has changed significantly 
since the early years of the 21st century.   
4.  Legislative Proposals Prior to 2016 Directive 
                                                          
33
 J.P. Lehrke and R. Schmaker (2014) ‘Mechanisms of Convergence in Domestic Counterterrorism 
Regulations: American Influence, Domestic Networks and International Networks’, 37(8) Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 689-712, p.693. 
34
 Ibid, p.698. 
35
 Pawlak supra  note 17, pp.9-10. 
36 M. Busuioc, and M. Groenleer  (2013) ‘Beyond Design: The Evolution of Europol and Eurojust’, 14(3) 
Perspectives of European Politics and Society, 285-304, p.293. 
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In relation to EU legislation covering passenger details in 2004 the Council adopted Directive 
2004/82/EC on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data. The Directive 
concerned the transfer of advanced passenger information (API). API differs from PNR data 
as it covers the machine-readable zone on a person’s passport that includes the passenger’s 
name, date of birth, nationality and passport number.37 The adoption of this Directive was 
relatively rapid as transferring API is less controversial than transferring PNR data. PNR data 
depends on information the passenger submits during the time of the reservation that includes 
more detailed personal information such as method of payment, dietary requirements, 
personal contact information and complete travel itinerary. By offering such detailed 
information the main concern advocates of data protection have is PNR data could be used 
for more detailed profiling by officers in relevant agencies on the background of individuals 
and the possible relationship to other persons being searched at port and border controls.38 
Data protection has been a major hurdle proponents of the need for legislative provisions 
related to PNR data acquisition and transfer had to overcome. Due to the EU’s strict 
legislative provisions through the likes of the 1995 Data Directive and concern over privacy 
rights, it has been problematic in finding an effective solution that balances data protection 
requirements alongside protecting the security of states and its citizens. 
Following the failed car bomb attacks in London and Glasgow Airport in June 2007,39 the 
Commission introduced a proposal for a Framework Decision on PNR data with the aim of 
the Framework Decision to aid the prevention and combatting of terrorism and organised 
crime.40As only the UK, France and Denmark had primary legislation to capture PNR data,41 
                                                          
37 M. Tzanou (2015) ‘The war Against Terror and Transatlantic information Sharing: Spillovers of Privacy or 
Spillovers of Security?, 31(80) Utrecht Journal of international and European law, 87-103, p.96. 
38 E. Brouwer (2009) ‘The EU Passenger name record System and Human Rights: Transferring passenger data 
or passenger freedom’ CEPS Working Document no.320/September 2009, p.3. 
39 Argomaniz supra  note 18, p.130. 
40 Tzanou supra note 37, p.95. 
41 Brouwer supra  note385, p.4. 
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the aim of the Framework Decision was to provide harmonisation throughout the EU of PNR 
data collection and exchange ensuring safeguards are given to persons aimed at protecting 
their right to privacy.42 As the Framework Decision contained a dearth of data protection 
provisions along with the PNR data to be transmitted virtually identical to the categories 
listed in the then EU-US Agreement,43 it is understandable why there were concerned 
responses to the proposal. The proposal contained only two articles regarding the protection 
of personal data that were vague and lightweight in providing detailed, adequate data 
protection,44 with no reference of consideration or adherence to the likes of the 1995 Data 
protection Directive. Although the proposal stated Member States had to set up Passenger 
Information Units (PIU) to be responsible for collecting and analysing PNR data, apart from 
stating any personal data collected revealing very personal information such as racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs,45 there were no provisions related to how 
and when PIU’s should protect personal data. 
Referring to them as ‘so-called- PIU’s’, in Brouwer’s analysis of their role she could not see 
the setting up of a PIU as a better policy option to protect personal data.46 Equally critical of 
the role of the PIU in the Framework Decision was the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) who could not agree that a PIU would provide sufficient safeguards saying that 
additional provisions should be integrated to specify strictly the competences and legal 
obligations of PIU’s.47 Seeing the role of PNR data not being simply to identify a person, but 
contributing to carrying out risk assessments of person to obtain intelligence and make 
                                                          
42 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law 
enforcement purposes COM(2007) 654 final, Explanatory Memorandum, p.6. 
43 Tzanou supra note 37, p.96. 
44 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law 
enforcement purposes COM(2007) 654 final, supra  note 42, articles 11 and 12. 
45 Ibid, article 3. 
46 Brouwer supra  note 38, p.5. 
47 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the draft Proposal for Council Framework Decision 
on the use of Passenger name record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes (2008/C 110/01), paragraph 73. 
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associations between known and unknown people,48 his most scathing opinions on the 
Framework Decision were in relation to necessity and proportionality issues. Regarding 
necessity, he deplored the lack of precise facts and figures related to the PNR saying: 
‘Numerous arrests’ are reported with regard to “various crimes” in the UK … without precision 
as to the link with terrorism or organised crime. No details are given with regard to the US 
programme, except that ‘the EU has been able to assess the value of PNR data and to realise its 
potential for enforcement purposes’49 
The EDPS saw PNR data no more than a data mining tool and as such the risk presented to 
individuals must be clearly established.50 Having similar views in relation to proportionality, 
the EDPS stated there needed to be a more in-depth and comprehensive analysis compared to 
what was presented in the Framework Decision proposal.51 He saw the shortcomings 
contained in the proposals leading to a move towards a total surveillance society.52 Equally 
critical of the Framework Decision proposal was Argomaniz who states that modelling the 
proposal on the US PNR scheme was carried out under the principle of reciprocity on 
information exchange with US authorities,53 but is one where there is a reciprocity deficit on 
the EU side.54 He argues that at this time not only did the EU-US PNR agreements 
demonstrate the asymmetrical relationship between the EU and the US, but also the likes of 
the 2007 PNR data Framework Decision proposal was an example of the US applying 
political and economic coercion to ensure European compliance. This may have been valid in 
2009 when Argomaniz raised this point, but, as this article will demonstrate, due to 
developments in the EU, by 2016 this position has changed. There is currently at the very 
least a symmetrical relationship between the EU and US, if not one that is now asymmetrical 
in favour of the EU. 
                                                          
48 Ibid, para. 14. 
49 Ibid, para. 27. 
50 Ibid, para. 29. 
51 Ibid, para. 34. 
52 Ibid, para. 35. 
53 Argomaniz supra note 18, p.131. 
54 Ibid, p.126. 
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Despite the lack of data protection provisions that would meet the EU standard, along 
with the damning criticism it resulted in the Framework Decision not being adopted,55 in 
2011 the Commission produced a proposal for a PNR Data Directive.56 While there was a 
more detailed provision related to data protection,57 with provisions related to the role of 
PIU’s very similar to that in the 2007 Framework decision proposal.58 The main concern with 
the 2011 PNR data Directive was the lack of protection of personal data, especially in relation 
to the transfer of PNR data to third countries. In an attempt to address this the following 
safeguards were contained in the Directive. Again one was an obligation placed on Member 
States to set up a PUI. The role of the PIU being to act as a filter by being responsible for 
collecting PNR data from air carriers, storing the information, analysing it and transmitting 
the analysis results to authorities competent in the prevention, detection, investigation or 
protection from terrorist offences or serious crime.59 While it was proposed that Member 
States could transfer PNR data to third countries, it could only do so when the transfer was 
necessary in relation to terrorist offences and serious crime.60 To ensure personal data was 
protected, the 2011 proposal stated that all procedures contained in the Directive could only 
be carried out under the conditions laid down under article 17-20 in the Framework Decision 
on the protection of personal data in police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters.61 
Although this Framework Decision will be repealed in May 2018 by Directive 2016/680,62 
under the Framework Decision63 the data subject has the right to expect the competent 
authority to fulfil its duties,64 which includes the right for the data subject to have a judicial 
                                                          
55
 Tzanou supra note 37, p.99. 
56 Directive 2011/0023.  
57 Ibid, article 11. 
58 Ibid, article 3. 
59
 Directive 2011/0023, article 3. 
60 Ibid, article 1(2). 
61 Ibid, article 11. 
62 Directive 2016/608, para. 98. 
63 FD 2008/977/JHA.. 
64
 FD 2008/997/JHA, article 18. 
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remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed to them by the applicable national law.65 
Where PNR data is transferred to a third country, prior to transferring the data there is a 
responsibility on the EU to ensure the third country has an adequate level of protection of the 
intended data processing.66 Despite the European Commission’s claim that the 2011 proposal 
had been subject to an in-depth scrutiny to ensure its provisions were compatible with 
fundamental rights, in particular article 8 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms (CFRF) on data protection, the safeguards were deemed as insufficient in 
protecting personal data. The European Parliament expressed concerns regarding the 
proposed method of automatically processing PNR data using fact based pre-determined 
assessment criteria, saying they were very wide and thought such an assessment should never 
result in, ‘…profiling on the basis of sensitive data.’67 Seeing insufficient protection of the 
individual’s data privacy in the Directive, the EDPS questioned if the PNR data Directive 
provisions met the legal criteria of necessity and proportionality. In the format the 2011 
Directive was presented, he did not perceive it as an effective tool in investigating terrorism 
and serious crime, rather he saw the move towards accessing and transferring PNR data doing 
nothing more but contributing towards a surveillance society.68  
5.  Concerns over the Surveillance Society: The 2013 Snowden Revelations 
As the EDPS had concerns in 2011 that the PNR Data Directive was a move contributing 
towards the expansion of a surveillance society, such fears were confirmed two years later 
with the Snowden revelations. In 2013 Snowden passed on files and information regarding 
the practices of the US’ National Security Agency (NSA) and the UK’s General 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) intelligence agencies in relation to Operation 
                                                          
65
 FD 2008/997/JHA, article 20. 
66
 FD 2008/997/JHA, article 14. 
67
 European Commission supra  note 3, p.10. 
68 Ibid, p.10. 
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PRISM to the journalist, Glen Greenwald who works for the UK newspaper, The Guardian.69 
In June 2013 both the The Guardian and The Washington Post broke with the news story 
regarding the NSA and the PRISM programme that gave US Federal agencies direct access to 
servers in the biggest web firms including Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo, Skype and 
Apple.70 These top secret documents revealed the NSA was collecting telephone records of 
millions of US customers under a top secret order issued in April 2013 saying that, ‘…the 
communication records of millions of US citizens are being collected indiscriminately and in 
bulk regardless of whether they are suspected of any wrongdoing’.71 The documents 
Snowden passed on revealed, it was not just US citizens subject to NSA surveillance, 
working alongside its UK counterpart GCHQ, the NSA gained access to the network of 
cables carrying the world’s phone calls and Internet traffic. This allowed the NSA and GCHQ 
to process vast streams of sensitive personal information.72 The co-operation between the UK 
and the US was not just limited to the NSA and GCHQ sharing information. It was revealed 
that through the access it had to the NSA’s PRISM programme, from May 2012 to April 
2013 GCHQ passed onto the UK’s security agencies, MI5, MI6 and Special Branch’s 
Counter-Terrorism Unit 197 PRISM intelligence reports 73 
The shock waves of the NSA’s actions reverberated around the world, more so when it was 
revealed that politicians in the EU Member States were also spied on by the NSA, in 
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particular the German Chancellor Angela Merkel.74 This resulted in a political dialogue 
between the EU and the US where the difference in legal culture between the two raised its 
head regarding individuals’ rights, with the EU’s focus being the dignity of citizens. In 
protecting fundamental human rights under the aegis of the rule of law, the EU requires a 
system of protection of an individual citizen’s data privacy,75 these are enshrined in a number 
of EU legal instruments. Conversely, no such explicit protection to a general right to privacy 
exists under the US Bill of Rights, it is inferred in the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth 
Amendments.76 This difference in legal protection is important as Snowden’s revelations had 
the potential to damage not only diplomatic relations between the US and EU Member States, 
it could have a detrimental long term affect in the terrorism intelligence and PNR data 
sharing between European counter-terrorism agencies and US federal agencies.  
6.  Criteria of Fitness for Purpose for a PNR Data Directive 
From both the EU’s PNR Agreements and the legislative proposals, one major stumbling 
block faced by the Council and the Commission in ensuring they meet the strict criteria in EU 
law related to data protection. There are more EU legal provisions related to data protection 
than just the 1995 Data protection Directive (although it underpins virtually all actions related 
to data protection). In addition to meeting this criteria, a PNR data Directive must be 
sufficiently robust to scrutiny by the CJEU. This section outlines those provisions and 
examines two important CJEU decision (Digital Rights77and Schrems 78) related to data 
protection that lays down the threshold that must be met.  
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6.1.  EU Data Protection Laws 
In relation to data protection article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), 
states everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them. Under article 
16 TFEU the European Parliament and the Council must act in accordance with ordinary 
legislative procedure, laying down rules protecting the processing of personal data by Union 
institutions, bodies, office and agencies when carrying out activities that fall within the scope 
of EU law. This legal obligation is also present in article 39 in the Treaty of Union. 
Underpinning these articles’ provisions is the EU’s CFRF. Since the Treaty of Lisbon 2009 
came into force, the CFRF has become a legally binding document ensuring all EU 
institutions and Member States apply the Charter’s principles when implementing EU law.  
Article 8 CFRF states that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning them. When EU institutions or Member States access the data it, ‘…must be 
processed fairly for specified purposes on the basis of consent of the person concerned or 
some other legitimate basis laid down by law.’79 This is in addition to the respect they must 
have for a person’s right to their private and family life, home and communication.80   
The 1995 Data Protection Directive81 states personal data can only be collected for specified, 
explicit and legitimate purpose and must not be processed in a way incompatible with these 
purposes.82  Member States can only derogate from the 1995 Directive where it is necessary 
to safeguard national security, defence, public security and the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences.83  The Directive on the protection of personal 
data processed for the purposes of preventing, investigating, detecting or prosecuting criminal 
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matters84 came into force 5thMay 2016 for Member States to transpose into their national law 
by 6th May 2018.85 In the preamble it is recognised that rapid technological developments and 
globalisation has brought new challenges for the protection of personal data where the scale 
of collecting and sharing this data has increased significantly and this includes by agencies 
involved in the prevention, investigation or detection of criminal offences.86 The Directive 
states that in the processing of personal data these agencies can only collect it for specific, 
explicit and legitimate purposes87 and to be lawful, the processing of personal data has to be 
necessary in the prevention, investigation or detection of criminal offences.88 The Directive is 
also very clear that when processing personal data fundamental rights and freedoms must be 
protected, especially the right of the protection of personal data.89 Important in protecting 
personal data are the safeguards present in any legislative provision, and drawing out from 
the Directive that are pertinent to the 2016 PNR data Directive this includes: 
1. Member States and the EU itself shall crate a ‘controller’90 who have a number of 
obligations under the Directive to oversee the processing and exchange of personal 
data. This includes ensuring the requests by relevant agencies for personal data are 
proportionate to the purposes of processing the data,91 and integrating the necessary 
safeguards in to the processing of the data;92 
2. Member States shall provide a data protection officer93whose roles include advising 
the controller and employees from agencies carrying out the processing of personal 
data and monitoring compliance with the Directive;94 
3. Where the data subject conspires their personal protection rights have been infringed, 
Member States must ensure data subjects have the right to an effective judicial 
remedy (which in practice will be through a judicial review process).95 
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One part that directly pertains to the 2016 PNR Data Directive in the 2016 protection of 
personal data Directive is the transfer of personal data to third countries or international 
organisation. In addition to the transfer of personal data to a third country having to meet the 
requirements of being necessary and proportionate for the purposes of preventing, 
investigating or detecting criminal offences,96 it is of paramount importance that the third 
country with whom the data is transferred has an adequate level of protection of personal 
data.97 If there is an absence of adequacy or protection in a third country, transfer of personal 
data under the 2016 Directive can only occur where such conditions are implemented under a 
negotiated legally binding instrument.98 
6.2.  The Impact the CJEU’s Decisions in Digital Rights and Schrems on Data Protection  
In Digital Rights the CJEU held Directive 2006/24/EC on the collection of bulk data by 
Member States’ intelligence and policing agencies was invalid as it contravened EU data 
protection laws. The CJEU stated two important legal issues were required to ensure personal 
data is protected: 
1. EU legislation must lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope and 
application of the measure in question; 
2. Minimum safeguards are imposed to provide sufficient guarantees effectively 
protecting personal data against the risk of abuse and against unlawful access and 
use.99 
 
In elucidating this point, the CJEU stated data can only be retained when it was necessary and 
proportionate to do so, albeit subject to the provisions of EU law and in particular the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as interpreted by the European Court of 
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Human Rights (ECtHR). Ojanen’s analysis of Digital Rights, states the more systemic and 
wide the collection, retention and analysis of bulk data becomes: 
…the closer it can be seen as moving towards the core area of privacy and data protection with 
the outcome that at least the most massive, systematic forms of collection and analysis of [bulk 
data] can be regarded as constituting an intrusion into the inviolable core of privacy and data 
protection.100 
The CJEU decision in Digital Rights was not a ‘total knockout’ to mandatory retention.101 In 
drawing up legislation that specifically gives the legitimate aim for the retention such as to 
support investigations into acts of terrorism or serious organised crime, specifying realistic 
periods of data retention and sufficient safeguards into protecting rights of privacy and data 
protection would be sufficient. By imposing on the EU legislator the responsibility to protect 
fundamental rights, Digital Rights imposes substantive instructions on law-makers at EU and 
Member States’ level to guarantee the protection of data protection and, importantly, provides 
a strict judicial scrutiny test.102  
In Schrems, since 2008 Maximillian Schrems, an Austrian citizen, used the social media 
network, Facebook. Although his contract was registered within the EU at the time of his 
registration with Facebook Ireland, this is a subsidiary of Facebook Incorporated which is 
established in the US, where Facebook Ireland users’ personal data is then transferred to the 
US. Schrems contended that the law and practice in the US did not ensure sufficient 
protection of his personal data and in referring to the Snowden revelations of NSA practices, 
he claimed his personal data could have been subject to retention by the NSA and other US 
federal agencies.103 The Irish High Court refered the case to the CJEU. 
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In his opinion judgment, Advocate General Bot held that as intervention of independent 
supervisory authorities is at the heart of the EU’s system of personal data protection, there 
must be a similar system of protection in the third country to which the data flows from the 
EU.104 In this case under the US’ Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978 the NSA 
accessed personal data inputted in Austria that was held by Facebook at a server in the US. 
Advocate General Bot held that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court does not offer an 
effective judicial remedy to EU citizens whose personal data has been transferred to the 
US.105 The CJEU declared the 2000/520 Decision invalid106 and consequently brought to an 
end an important EU-US trade agreement, the Safe Harbour Agreement. Crucial to the Court 
reaching this decision were the requirements of article 25 of the 1995 Data Protection 
Directive concerning the purpose and duration of the processing operation of the data, the 
country of origin and final country of destination, the law in operation related to data 
protection in the third country and the professional rules and security measures deployed 
regarding the data in the third country.107  
The most pertinent part of article 25 related to the issue in Schrems is the Commission’s 
responsibility to find that the third country ensures an adequate level of protection of basic 
freedoms and rights of individuals.108 Should the Commission find the third country does not 
provide an adequate level of protection, Member States are to take measures to prevent the 
transfer of data to the third country.109 Crucial to determining this is what is meant by the 
term ‘adequate’. The third country is not required to ensure there is a level of data protection 
identical to that guaranteed in EU law,110 Advocate General Bot said that the protection 
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implemented by the third country may differ from EU law, but it must provide adequate 
protection that is equivalent to that afforded by the 1995 Directive.111 Adopting the linguistic 
viewpoint of the word ‘adequate’ which means satisfactory or sufficient, Advocate General 
Bot said the obligation of the Commission is to ensure the third country has a sufficiently 
high level of protection of fundamental rights.112 The obligation to ensure the adequacy of 
data protection is not a one-off obligation made at the time of agreement. The obligation for 
the third country is an ongoing obligation to ensure that no changes in circumstances arise 
that can call into question the initial assessment113 and it is expected the Commission will 
regularly review the third country’s level of protection.114 The CJEU added that legislation 
permitting public authorities access to the content of electronic communications on a 
generalised basis must be regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to 
privacy under the CFRF.115  
7.  The 2016 PNR Directive   
A new draft text on an EU system for processing PNR data was tabled by Member of the 
European Parliament (MEP) Timothy Kirkhope, which was discussed in the EU’s civil 
liberties LIBE Committee on 26 February 2015.116 The draft text’s introduction covers issues 
discussed by MEP’s, which includes an evaluation of the necessity and proportionality of the 
proposal in the face of current security threats, its scope (list of offences covered), retention 
periods, the inclusion or exclusion of intra-EU flights, the connection with the on-going data 
protection reform, as well as the consequences of the CJEU judgment in Digital Rights. The 
terrorist attacks in Paris in January and November 2015 may have accelerated movement by 
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EU officials in introducing the 2015 PNR Directive proposal. On the 4th December 2015 the 
Council of the European Union moved swiftly to endorse the PNR Directive proposal that 
was approved by the European Parliaments’ Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
committee and the European Parliament in early 2016.117 As a result, the PNR data Directive 
2016/681 was introduced on the 27th April 2016 to enable the transfer of PNR data between 
Member States and third countries. Following the previous unsuccessful attempts to introduce 
PNR data legislation, key to this Directive being fit for purpose is in meeting the EU’s data 
protection laws as well assisting in preventing acts of terrorism. 
7.1  A comparison between 2011 and 2016 Directive 
While the processing of the PNR data in the two Directives is on a case-by-case basis to deal 
with terrorism and serious crime, in comparison to the 2011 proposal, the 2016 Directive 
contains greater safeguards in relation to protecting personal data. While both PNR Data 
Directives state that Member States establish a PIU118 with the responsibility to ensure data is 
processed correctly with consideration of protection of personal data,119 the 2016 Directive 
goes further stating the PIU must appoint a data protection officer who will be responsible for 
implementing safeguards.120 The PNR data storage is to be carried out exclusively by PIU’s 
within a secure location within the territory of the Member State.121 Not considered in the 
2011 version, Member States shall ensure a data subject has the right to contact the data 
protection officer as a single point of contact on all issues related to the processing of the 
subject’s PNR data.122 In the 2016 Directive Europol is also entitled to request PNR data on a 
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case-by-case basis where the request is strictly necessary to strengthen Member States in 
preventing, detecting or investigating specific terrorist offences or serious crime provided it is 
within Europol’s competence. In such circumstances Europol must inform the data protection 
officer of each exchange.123 This inclusion is significant as Europol’s role has not only 
increased in supporting and assisting in police co-operation among Member States and third 
countries, post 2009 Treaty of Lisbon Europol’s activities has come under the scrutiny of the 
European Parliament124 and the CJEU via the judicial review process. Added to this, citizens 
in each Member State can apply for the judicial review process against the respective public 
bodies in either the domestic courts or the CJEU. This provides another safeguard in 
protecting personal data. Also contained in the 2016 Directive, which was not included in the 
2011 version, is the requirement that Member States provide a national supervisory authority 
to verify the lawfulness of the data processing and deal with and investigate complaints 
(which includes informing complainants of the progress and outcome of the 
investigations).125 The role of the supervisory authority is extensive in protecting citizens’ 
rights.126 The supervisory authority must be independent,127 have qualifications, experience 
and skills in the area of personal data128 and the appointment must be made by means of a 
transparent procedure.129  
The 2016 PNR Data directive makes it very clear that transfer of PNR data to a third country 
can only be transferred by a Member State once it is has been ascertained the third country’s 
use of the data is to make use of it in accordance with the Directive’s aim and that country 
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has sufficient legal safeguards in place to protect that data.130 In all cases where PNR data is 
transferred to a third country the Member State must inform the data protection officer.131 
Underpinning all of this is article 13 of the Directive that states each Member State shall 
provide that every passenger subject to PNR data has the protection of their personal data, 
rights of access, rectification, erasure and judicial redress as laid down in Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA regarding the protection of personal data processed in the framework 
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This will only apply to the 6th May 
2018 when it is repealed by the 2016 Directive on protecting personal data in criminal 
matters.132 In the 2016 Directive there has been an increase in the provision of legal 
safeguards protecting personal data that appears to meet the EU’s legal requirements 
provided for in EU legal instruments and follows the guidance from the CJEU’s decisions. 
7.2  Assessing the 2016 Directive’s Fitness for Purpose: Data Protection  
 
Even though there have been extensive changes regarding the protection of personal data, 
there are still concerns with the 2016 Directive regarding it being fit for purpose. In 2015 the 
EDPS published his opinion on the current PNR data Directive. While in general he 
welcomed the improvements made by the European Council and civil liberties LIBE 
Committee on the provisions contained in the Directive regarding the provisions on data 
protection,133 he still has some reservations. On bulk and indiscriminate collection of data he 
recognised that PNR data would cover at least all flights to and from the EU concerning more 
than 300 million non-suspect passengers a year. The EDPS recommended that the Directive 
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ensure that the data obtained pertained to a particular time period, geographical zone and a 
circle of particular persons likely to be involved in terrorism and serious crime.134 In addition 
to recommending that the data retention period be shorter than five years, he is sceptical that 
the rationale to obtain PNR data under the notion of immediate and serious threat to public 
security or serious transnational crimes is sufficiently specific to meet the standards set in the 
Digital Rights decision.135 This is questionable. In addition to terrorist activity, Annex II of 
the 2016 Directive lists specific criminal activity, all of which are serious crimes that are 
punishable by a custodial sentence for a maximum period of at least three years.136 To meet 
the criteria contained in the 2016 Directive’s safeguards, it is assumed that where it is not 
related to terrorist activity, an application for access to PNR data will specify one of those 
crimes for it to be granted. Surely this is sufficiently specific? 
 
To help allay some of these concerns could be the role Europol plays. The EDPS makes a 
pertinent recommendation that the Member State agencies responsible for dealing with PNR 
data align themselves with the regime applicable to Europol to restrict conditions of access to 
the PNR data processed by the EU.137 This is a logical step. As stated, Europol is subject of 
judicial scrutiny as post 2009 Treaty of Lisbon Europol’s actions are subject to judicial 
review by the CJEU138 and this would help ensure legal redress by citizens who are 
concerned their data was misused. The Treaty of Lisbon has not just ensured there is solely 
judicial scrutiny of its actions, the Treaty also affords the European Parliament and Member 
States’ parliaments authority over Europol.139 In addition to this Europol’s role in counter-
                                                          
134 Ibid, p.7. 
135
 Ibid, p.13. 
136 Directive 2016, article 3(9). 
137
 EDPS opinion, supra  note 133, p.13. 
138
 Busuioc and Groenleer supra  note 36, p.299. 
139
 J.D. Ochipinti ‘Still Moving Towards a European FBI? Re-Examining the Politics of EU Police 
Cooperation’, 30(2), Intelligence and National Security, (2015), 234-258, p.246. 
26 
 
terrorism and in dealing with serious criminal activity has grown both within the EU and on 
the international stage. Helping this growth has been Europol’s permanent unit of experts to 
provide national authorities with analysis and support. As a result Europol staff members 
have become increasingly important as project managers for its analytical work files that are 
being used more extensively because Europol has proven that its information sharing systems 
can be trusted to protect personal data.140 Another key development in Europol has been the 
creation of the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) where one of the aims of the 
ECTC is to improve information exchange between Member States’ law enforcement 
agencies.  On the ECTC, Europol’s Director, Rob Wainwright said: 
Our ambition is for the European Counter Terrorism Centre to become a central information 
hub in the fight against terrorism in the EU, providing analysis for ongoing investigations and 
contributing to a coordinated reaction in the event of major terrorist attacks. Europol is grateful 
for the support of the Member States, the European Parliament and the European Commission 
in the establishment of the ECTC. It will lie at the heart of a stronger EU standing up to the 
threat of terrorism.141  
 
As Europol has the staff, resources and departments that are legally accountable, and, 
experienced in ensuring compliance with EU personal data law, a logical policy step would 
be for Member States to consult Europol to scrutinise requests for PNR data on a case-by-
case basis, especially in cases of a third country request. With Europol scrutinising and co-
ordinating PNR data transfer, it will ensure a greater degree of protection of EU citizens’ 
personal data when sharing of the data with third countries.  
 
7.3  Assessing the 2016 Directive’s Fitness for Purpose: Preventing Terrorist Acts 
In the five years since the 2011 PNR Data Directive failed to be introduced there has been a 
changing landscape of international terrorist activity, mainly through the rise and influence of 
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the terrorist group Islamic State (IS). There are two aspects to this, one being the number of 
EU citizens travelling from the EU to join IS in its self-proclaimed caliphate in Syria/Iraq and 
the terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015 and 2016 carried out by IS inspired terrorists. In 
addition to this a number of EU Member States have introduced anti-terrorism related 
legislation to deal with citizens travelling to conflict areas related to terrorist activity. The UK 
has granted powers for seizure of passports at ports and airports from persons suspected of 
involvement in terrorism142 and Germany has made it a crime to travel outside the country 
with the intent to receive terrorist training.143 Access to PNR data is very useful to assist 
investigations on individuals to assess if they are bone fide passengers or if they meet the 
provisions under this type of legislation. This is important as PNR data could reveal 
information on individuals who have not come to the attention of the competent authorities 
but who received assistance with those who have. As PNR data provides more details that 
API such as who booked the travel and how it was paid may just be sufficient to alert those 
authorities of either a potential terrorist threat on or in the vicinity of an aircraft, or of travel 
to a destination linked to other terrorist activity.  This can also be applied to serious crime 
such as drug trafficking where members of an organised crime groups make the travel 
arrangements for drug mules.  
Prevention of terrorist attacks or crime is notoriously difficult to measure. Since the 
introduction of PNR data exchange and the security measures at airports brought about by 
passenger attempts to use aircraft in acts of terrorism, there have been very few incidents 
since the 2009 attempt at Denver. The acquisition and exchange of PNR data has contributed 
in making it difficult for terrorists to use aircraft in acts of terrorism. As stated above, this is 
not the only activity to link terrorism and air travel. As air travel is still used by those directly 
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or indirectly associated with terrorist organisations PNR data is a very useful source of 
information to assist counter-terrorist investigators identifying patterns of behaviour or 
simply to target individuals for port stops such as those in the UK under Schedule 7 terrorism 
Act 2000. The value of this intelligence in preventing terrorist acts, thereby saving many 
innocent lives cannot be underestimated, and the same principle can be applied to those 
involved in investigating serious criminal activity. 
7.4  Assessing the 2016’s Directive’s Fitness for Purpose: Robustness to Legal 
Challenges and does it go far Enough? 
At the time of writing an important CJEU decision is pending in relation to the Canada-EU 
PNR agreement.144 Following a referral by the European Parliament in November 2015 
regarding concerns over protection of personal data in the EU-Canada PNR data agreement 
signed in 2014.145 The case went to the CJEU in April 2016 where the European Parliament’s 
concerns centred on period of time prior to anonymisation of PNR data, the necessity of 
processing PNR data in terrorist investigations, period of retention of PNR data and 
independent supervision of data protection in Canada.146 On the 8th September 2016 the 
Advocate General’s Opinion was published where Advocate General Mengozzi in finding 
some aspects of the agreement was compatible with the EU’s CFRF, he also found certain 
provisions of the agreement were contrary to the EU’s CFRF: 
1. in particular provisions allowing PNR data being processed he saw as being beyond 
that being strictly necessary (terrorist offences and serious forms of transnational 
crime); 
2. the provision for processing, use and retention by Canada of PNR data containing 
sensitive data; 
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3. disclosure by Canada of information without a connection to public security as 
agreed; 
4. retention of PNR data by Canada for up to five years 
5. allowing PNR being transferred to Canada without satisfactory independent 
supervision that that data would not be transferred to by Canada to another foreign 
body.147 
Many human rights groups celebrated this decision. In making links between the agreement 
and the 2016 Directive they see it as a probable death knell for the Directive. For example, 
the group ‘accessnow’ had the headline that the agreement ‘won’t fly’, but even this group 
admit if sufficient safeguards were put in place, the agreement could be legal under EU 
law.148 It is suggested that in linking the issues raised in the decision on the agreement to the 
Directive these groups’ argument is premature, optimistic at best. The reason being, one that 
is the nub of the issue elucidated above, the 2016 Directive has been drafted to ensure it 
meets the strict EU law on data protection with a numerous safeguards in place to prevent 
abuse of personal data. While Advocate General’s Decision A-1.15 may be the death knell 
for current separate EU PNR data agreements with third countries, it must surely be assumed 
the 2016 Directive will be the instrument used to underpin any future agreements to transfer 
PNR data to third countries.  
Part of the problem could be the term ‘PNR data’, which for many MEP’s has become 
increasingly a metaphor for surveillance of EU citizens by foreign states149 that emanates 
from suspicions behind the earlier PNR agreements, especially with the US. This is seen in 
Huijboom and Bodea’s study that led them to state MEP’s have not only framed the PNR 
debate through the lens of EU citizens’ rights, but also through the lens of the EU’s 
                                                          
147
 Court of Justice of the European Union Press release No 89/16, ‘Advocate General’s Opinion in the Request 
for an Opinion 1/15’, Luxembourg 8th September 2016 < 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-09/cp160089en.pdf>. 
148 Accessnow (2016) ‘Advocate General Opinion on EU Canada PNR agreement: it won’t fly’ 8th September 
2016 < https://www.accessnow.org/advocate-general-opinion-eu-canada-pnr-agreement-wont-fly/>. 
149
 N. Huijboom and G. Bodea, ‘Understanding the political PNR Debate in Europe: A Discourse Analytical 
Perspective’, 16(2), European Politics and Society, (2015), 241-255, p.248. 
30 
 
democratic deficit.150 In attempting to understand why the majority of Europeans hold such 
narrow focus on the philosophy on data protection resulting in them having a high concern 
for and holding strict adherence to privacy rights, Rizer suggests it emanates from the death 
lists and domestic spying in both Nazi Germany and in Soviet-ruled Eastern Europe.151 This 
fear seems to be reflected in both the political and legal research in this area. On the 2016 
PNR data Directive, when it was still in its proposal stage Tzanou saw in the EU’s fight 
against terrorism, privacy and data protection taking ‘a back seat’ to security initiatives.152 
This observation has validity when examining the early PNR agreements and PNR legislative 
proposals, but not so much with the 2016 Directive, which is replete with data protection 
safeguards. Influential in many studies on intelligence gathering, especially in relation to 
PNR data is Argomaniz’s 2009 work where he correctly states at that time there was an 
asymmetrical  relationship between the EU and the US, with the US having a more dominant 
relationship with the EU.153 Seven years later that position has changed. As the EU’s agencies 
have developed so has its law and the confidence of the CJEU to overturn international 
agreements. As seen in Schrems, if the CJEU see breaches of EU law, the Court is not averse 
to making decision that result in the ending of important and lucrative trade agreements with 
the US. As a result it now appears there is symmetrical relationship between the EU and the 
US. Even Tzanou concedes the point that being based on the rule of law that respects human 
rights the EU is seen as a leader of ‘moral good’. Security interests and data protection are 
not exclusive entities, they are and should be intertwined, especially where security interests 
are concerned in protecting the most important human right, the right to life. 
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If there is one area where the 2016 Directive is deficient is it covers air travel only. As stated, 
the UK has had PNR data programmes in place since 2004 and the UK is currently looking to 
expand this to rail and ferry travel. When the PNR Framework Decision was introduced the 
UK’s House of Lords European Union Committee saw the Framework Decision limited by 
only covering air travel. Their 2008 Report on the Framework Decision stated the UK 
government would like to extend PNR data to cover other forms of travel.154 As PNR data 
acquisition and exchange has assisted in making air travel safer, as terrorists planning to carry 
out an attack on an aircraft know they can be traced and prevented from carrying out that 
attack, this seems to be a logical step. If PNR data was extended to include international train 
travel on mainland Europe and the Eurostar service between the UK and Paris/Brussels as 
well as international ferry services in Europe, this would increase the ability of policing 
agencies investigating terrorist acts and serious crime to monitor the movement and activities 
of suspects. This would not be just monitoring those who suspected of planning attacks on 
these forms of transport, but also monitor suspects’ movements around Europe. Both the 
Paris and Brussels attacks in 2015 and 2016 involved terrorists that travelled around Europe 
and, accepting this will not prevent terrorists and criminals from using other forms of 
transport, it will result in making their travel more difficult with the correlative effect being 
making Europe safer. Seeing how for the last fourteen years it has been problematic in 
introducing PNR data legislation that focuses solely on air travel, this may be too early to 
take this step due to the fears of widening even further access to citizens’ personal data. In 
itself this factor does not affect the 2016 Directive’s fitness for purpose related to air travel. 
8.  Conclusion 
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In addition to the serious criminal activity ongoing with the EU, the current terrorist threat 
facing many EU Member States alone necessitates the importance in introducing the 2016 
PNR Data Directive. In the past eighteen months 179 citizens have been killed with many 
more seriously injured in three separate terrorist incidents in EU Member States. It is unlikely 
the terrorist threat in Europe will abate in the coming years. One of the aims of the 2016 PNR 
Data Directive is to enhance the ability of agencies investigating terrorist activity in 
preventing terrorist attacks and to monitor air travel of persons suspected of being involved in 
terrorist activity. On the grounds of necessity, there is a need for a PNR data Directive. While 
it is important for the EU and its Member States to ensure the needs of national security are 
met, it is equally important fundamental rights and freedoms are also met. Neither is mutually 
exclusive. In relation to PNR data while it is important to protect personal data, it is equally 
important a balance is made between the two as protecting security equates to protecting 
citizens’ right to life. 
The lack of personal data protection has been the undoing of previous EU PNR data 
agreements and attempts by the EU to introduce legislation.. As EU law has developed in this 
area, it has incrementally tightened the protection of personal data. This is reflected in the 
CJEU decisions, none more so than in the Digital Rights and Schrems cases. Digital Rights 
laid down criteria EU law must adopt in its legal instruments related to the protection of 
personal data in criminal matters. While the 2016 Directive on protecting personal data in 
criminal matters evolved due to concerns with the increase of the surveillance society, one 
can see the influence of the CJEU in Digital Rights in the drafting of this Directive. Equally 
important has been the CJEU’s decision in Schrems which ended an EU-US trade agreements 
on the ground’s the US had an inadequate provisions for the protection of personal data. This 
has had an important bearing on the transferring of data from EU Member States to third 
countries in all aspects of EU activity, including terrorism and criminal activity. These 
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developments have contributed to there being a more symmetrical relationship between the 
EU and the US.  
Returning to the 2016 PNR Data Directive, there are a number of safeguards in place to 
ensure personal data is protected. This ranges the creation and responsibilities of the PIU and 
the data protection officers in each Member State, to the ability of citizens to have judicial 
supervision. All of these provisions are underpinned by the protection of personal data as laid 
down in the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, to be replaced in 2018 by the more all-
encompassing 2016 Directive on the protection of personal data in criminal matters. In 
addition to the safeguards, the 2016 Directive is sufficiently specific and proportionate as it 
only applies to specific serious crimes and terrorist incidents. The Directive not only has 
sufficient safeguards, it ensures the data is accessed and transferred where necessary with 
sufficient specificity to meet EU law requirements. In addressing if the 2016 PNR Data 
Directive is fit for purpose, it is argued in relation the points made above it is. 
 
 
